A LEGACY FOR NEW JERSEY
Mark A. Sullivan*
The retirement of Associate Justice Worrall F. Mountain in June
1979, and that of Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes two months later in
August 1979, will have a dramatic impact on the New Jersey Supreme Court and its reputation as one of the premier state courts of
last resort in the country. It goes without saying that the direction in
which the Court will move after these retirements will depend, to a
large extent, on the judicial philosophy of their successors.
Chief Justice Hughes, appointed to that office in December
1973, has been a worthy successor to Arthur T. Vanderbilt and
Joseph Weintraub.' In addition to being a former Governor of this
State, he served for nearly ten years as a Superior Court Judge with
extensive trial experience, Assignment Judge responsibility and Appellate Division exposure. Thus, he brought with him to the office of
Chief Justice not only broad judicial background, but also proven
executive and administrative abilities.
During his term as Chief Justice he has strengthened the avenues of communication with the Executive and Legislative branches
of government without sacrificing, in any degree, the independence
and integrity of the Judiciary. He is the only Chief Justice, in modern
times at least, who was invited to and did deliver a State of the
Judiciary Address to a joint session of the Senate and Assembly attended by the Governor and other high ranking State officials. 2
On that historic occasion, Chief Justice Hughes spoke of a concept of which he has been keenly aware throughout his public life:
the fundamental interdependence of each branch of our government.
Though "each branch ...

is separate, and the powers of government

are constitutionally divided among them," he advocated "cooperative
communication" in order to meet the modern demands upon government. 3 Chief Justice Hughes' address on that twenty-first day of
* Associate Justice, New Jersey Supreme Court.
The tragic death of Chief Justice Pierre P. Garvin in October, 1973, after only six weeks

in office, cut short a promising judicial career.
2 100 N.J.L.J. 1139 (1977). Appearing at the legislature's invitation, the Chief Justice noted
that the purpose of the address was to offer "an account of [the Court's] stewardship of [the
judicial] system," relate the "condition of its courts," highlight programs "for improvement in
the administration of justice, and . . . outline . . . the resources necessary" for the implementa-

tion of these plans. Id.
' Id. Chief Justice Hughes indicated that each of the three departments of government are
supportive of and complementary to one another. Id. Although recognizing the demonstration of
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November in 1977 is certainly a bench mark in establishing that vital
link between the Judicial branch and the- Executive and Legislative
4
branches of our state government.

Another fundamental precept of the Chief Justice's view of the
role of the Court was evident from his presentation that day. He
clearly expressed the need to maintain "a court system effective to
meet changing demands on the administration of justice." 5 And
there is no doubt that he was sensitive to these changing demands.
As he stated:
[T]he courts are confronted today with large new areas of judicial
responsibility-environmental law, civil rights law, consumer law,

product liability and malpractice law, prison rights cases-an almost endless list of new burdens thrust upon the courts, not so
much by their own choice as by the converging pressures of this
half of the 20th Century, in the context of the Constitutions under
6
which we live.

Chief Justice Hughes recognized that public confidence in the
court system is an absolute necessity. 7

Under his auspices, there-

fore, the Supreme Court established an Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct in, 1974,8 with retired Justice John J. Francis as the
Chairman. The Committee's purpose is to review complaints of improper conduct made against judges and report its findings and recommendations to the Supreme Court. This Committee, made up in
respect accorded each branch by the others, the Chief Justice reminded the audience that the
branches were not "watertight compartments." Id. Accordingly, "there should be no artificial
barrier preventing communication among them in the public interest." Id.
4 A pivotal factor in opening the lines of communication between the departments as noted
by Chief Justice Hughes is a recognition and consideration of the "joint obligations to the
people" required of each branch. Id. The Chief justice asserted the importance of demonstrating a mutual commitment to "the administration of justice." Id. He continued: "This bridge of
precise communication with the people will result in honest accountability, an indispensable key
to good government and the administration of justice alike." Id.
5 Id. Accordingly, Chief Justice Hughes urged "close communication and cooperation
among all branches of government" in coping with the extensive demands on the court system.
Id.
6 Id. The genesis of this increased responsibility is the United States Supreme Court, New
Jersey legislative and State Supreme Court initiatives. Id. As the Chief Justice indicated, the
United States Supreme Court's "definition and enforcement of constitutional right," the legislature's delineation of new judicial duties, and the evaluation of New Jersey Supreme Court
policy all contributed to the creation of a novel area of law. Id. Also burdensome, according to
the Chief Justice, "is the modern phenomenon of criminal violence, pervasive, frightening,
[and] unprecedented," which has resulted in a heightened demand for the quick "disposition of
cases involving those who threaten the community." id.
7 Id.
8

at 1140.

N.J.R. 2:15.
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part of lay members, provides a forum where these complaints can be
heard and has helped to improve public trust in our court system. 9 In
addition, during Chief Justice Hughes' tenure the Supreme Court has
completely revised the handling of ethics complaints against attorneys. 10 Regional Ethics Committees have been established and procedures adopted to insure due process to both the complaining client
and the attorney. 11 Lay persons have been added to the membership of each committee to strengthen public confidence in ethics
committee work.
Perhaps the greatest accomplishment by Chief Justice Hughes
was his sponsorship of the merger of the County Courts into the
Superior Court. Arthur T. Vanderbilt had tried to accomplish this at
the Constitutional Convention of 1947 as part of his concept of an
integrated court system.12 He failed, however, because parochial interests insisted on a constitutional "local" court even though it did not
fit into the plan for unification. It took thirty years and a constitutional amendment to correct this anomaly. To accomplish it, the
Governor, the Legislature and the Judiciary cooperated to the fullest
extent. But it was Chief Justice Hughes' outspoken support of the
measure before taxpayer groups and other interested bodies which
really made this reform possible.
In fact, on March 25, 1977, he appeared before the Assembly
Judiciary Committee to testify on behalf of the resolutions which
eventually brought the needed constitutional amendment to a public
vote. 13 He made it clear that a unified court system had been considered one of the essential ingredients for establishing a superior
system of justice during the Constitutional Convention, the others
being "flexibility, conservation of judicial power and responsibility." 14

9 100 N.J.L.J. at 1140. As Chief Justice Hughes remarked: "It's work has been magnificent
and has, we think, restored much public confidence in the ability of the courts to police and
regularize their conduct and so deserve the confidence of the public.'" Id.
10 See id. at 1141.
11 Under the present system, a purported ethics violation is initially examined by a county
ethics committee assisted by a Central Ethics Unit. Id. After a hearing, this local committee
either presents the Supreme Court with its findings or dismisses the complaint. Id. If the
committee recommends disciplinary action, the attorney charged with a violation is afforded an
opportunity to present his argument at a hearing before the Supreme Court. Id. At the hearing's conclusion, "the Court may disbar, suspend or reprimand the attorney or dismiss the
matter." id.
12 Id. at 1140; see IV STATE OF NEW JERSEY, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947, at
13 (remarks of Chief Justice-designate Arthur T. Vanderbilt).
13 100 N.J.L.J. 281 (1977).
14 Id. at 291. This position was first articulated by Dean Roscoe Pound at the 1947 New
Jersey Constitutional Convention. Id.
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Chief Justice Hughes expressed his intention "to fight, as did [his]
predecessors, for the integrity of that court system." 15 Now, due
largely to his efforts, that battle to unify the courts has been won.
Despite the press of his administrative duties, Chief Justice
Hughes found time to carry his share of opinion work. His writings
reflect the firmness of his intellect and his strong commitment to judicial power as set forth in the New Jersey Constitution. He sought
to avoid confrontation with the other co-equal branches of government, but did not hesitate to stand firm where he thought it necessary. For example, in the case of Robinson v. Cahill, 6 the Court was
faced with a constitutional crisis. 17 In an earlier opinion, the Court
had held the system of school financing in the State to be violative of
the education clause of the New Jersey Constitution.'" Subsequently, the Legislature was given a reasonable period in which to
remedy this situation.1 9 Action was not forthcoming from that
branch of government, however, and the Court was petitioned for
relief. 20 The Chief Justice stated the matter succinctly:
The Court has now come face to face with a constitutional exigency involving, on a level of plain, stark and unmistakable reality,
the constitutional obligation of the Court to act. Having previously

identified a profound violation of constitutional right, based upon
default in a legislative obligation imposed by the organic law in the
plainest of terms, we have more than once stayed our hand, with
appropriate respect for the province of other Branches of government. In final alternative, we must now proceed to enforce the
21
constitutional right involved.

The sentiment of that passage is amplified later in the opinion,
where the Chief Justice wrote:
This Court, as the designated last-resort guarantor of the
Constitution's command, possesses and must use power equal to its
responsibility. Sometimes, unavoidably incident thereto and in response to a constitutional mandate, the Court must act, even in a

15

id.

16

69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).

17 Id. at 139, 351 A.2d at 716.
18
19

Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973). Unwilling to "disturb the statutory

scheme," the Supreme Court afforded the New Jersey legislature an opportunity to revamp the
school financing system in accordance with the Court's decision. Id. at 198, 306 A.2d at 66. The
Supreme Court, however, retained jurisdiction. Id.
20 69 N.J. at 143, 351 A.2d at 718.
21 Id. at 139-40, 351 A.2d at 716 (footnote omitted).
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sense seem to encroach, in areas otherwise reserved to other
Branches of government ....

And while the court does so, when it

must, with restraint and even reluctance, there comes a time when
22
no alternative remains. That time has now arrived.
The Court then ordered that certain funds only be disbursed in accordance with specific statutes which the Court found would effect
23
relief from the unconstitutional system.
Another of Chief Justice Hughes' opinions, In re Quinlan,24 attracted world-wide attention. That case, more than an), other writing
of the Chief Justice, shows his compassion and his understanding of
the tragic problem faced by the Quinlan family. Confronted by conflicting moral, religious and ethical concepts, the Quinlan opinion
sought to establish a rule of law which would protect individual rights
and still permit family members, doctors and the hospital to cope
with a tragic situation. Twenty-one year old Karen Quinlan, for
reasons never fully determined, had stopped "breathing for at least
two fifteen minute periods" and as a result had lapsed into a
'"1chronic persistent vegetative state.' "25 Her father sought
to be
appointed guardian of Karen's person with the authority to discontinue the extraordinary means of support which sustained his daughter's vital functions. 26 The Chief Justice framed the legal question as
follows:
The litigation has to do, in final analysis, with her life,-its
continuance or cessation,-and the responsibilities, rights and
duties, with regard to any fateful decision concerning it, of her

22 Id. at 154-55, 351 A.2d at 724.
23 Id. at 155, 351 A.2d at 724. Specifically, the Court directed that those New Jersey officers involved with the collection and allocation of funds "appropriated by the legislature for
local educational purposes for the" 1976-1977 school year be "enjoined from disbursing designated minimum support and save harmless funds . . . in accordance with existing laws." Id.
Rather, the Chief Justice commanded these state officers "to distribute and disburse said funds
in accordance with the incentive equalization aid formula of N.J.S.A. 18A:58-5, subd. b, 6.3."
Id. The Supreme Court noted, however, that in the event the legislature acted in a "timely and
constitutionally appropriate manner" to remedy the situation, the above directions would not

apply. Id.
24 70 N.J.

10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).

25 70 N.J. at 23-24, 355 A.2d at 653-54. This condition was defined by expert witness Dr.

Fred Plum "as a 'subject who remains with the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of
neurological function but who . . . no longer has any cognitive function.'" Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at
654.
26 Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651. Although the trial court had appointed Mr. Quinlan guardian
of his daughter's property, it declined to name him guardian over Karen's person. Id. at 34, 355
A.2d at 670. The lower tribunal, instead, appointed a "stranger" to handle Karen's personal
affairs. Id. at 18, 34, 355 A.2d at 651, 660.
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family, her guardian, her doctors, the hospital, the State through
27
its law enforcement authorities, and finally the courts of justice.
Noting the importance of the issue before the Court, the Chief Justice continued to state:
The matter is of transcendent importance, involving questions
related to the definition and existence of death; the prolongation of
life through artificial means developed by medical technology undreamed of in past generations of the practice of the healing arts;
the impact of such durationally indeterminate and artificial life prolongation on the rights of the incompetent, her family and society
in general; the bearing of constitutional right and the scope of judicial responsibility, as to the appropriate response of an equity court
of justice to the extraordinary prayer for relief of the plaintiff. 28
These issues were indeed momentous. In re Quinlan, however,
is a great opinion for a different reason. It came to grips with reality
29
and offered a realistic solution.
In addition to his executive and judicial talents Chief Justice
Hughes is noted for his sense of humor. One of his favorite anecdotes
concerns his illness and brief hospitalization when he was Governor.
At the time, he had been feuding with the New Jersey Senate over
its use of senatorial courtesy to block a number of important nominations he had made. As Chief Justice Hughes tells the story, when
news of his illness reached the Senate, a "Get Well and Speedy Recover)" resolution was introduced and passed in that House by a vote
of seven for, five against and nine abstentions.
A final word on Chief Justice Hughes. In presenting his State of
the Judiciary address, he made the following statement:

Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
id. at 19-20, 355 A.2d at 652 (footnote omitted).
29 Chief Justice Hughes fashioned relief "appropriate to this case." Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at
671. The Court articulated the following formulation:
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the responsible
attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever
emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and that
the life-support apparatus now being administered to Karen should be discontinued,
they shall consult with the hospital 'Ethics Committee' or like body of the institution in which Karen is then hospitalized. If that consultative body agrees that there
is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may be withdrawn and said action shall be without any civil or criminal liability therefore on the
part of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others.
Id. (footnote omitted).
27
28
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I deem it my duty as Chief Justice, and I hope that my successor
Chief Justices will continue this policy, to maintain close communication with the people, who are the final judges of the extent to
which the courts are to be supported. In the hands of the people,
at the end, rests the power to secure the availability of justice by
supporting and maintaining the court system on which it depends.

30

This legacy of Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes is one of which the
people of this State have every right to be proud.
Justice Mountain, like the Chief Justice, brought considerable
experience with him to the Supreme Court. He was appointed to the
Superior Court in 1966 by then Governor Hughes. Prior to that time
he had practiced law in the Morris County area and established for
himself an enviable record of competence and achievement. As a
Superior Court Judge, he sat in the Chancery Division presiding in
the Passaic County vincinage. In 1970 he was assigned to the Appellate Division and one year later was selected by Govenor Cahill to fill
the vacancy on the Supreme Court caused by the retirement of Vincent Haneman, now deceased.
One of Justice Mountain's great interests has been that of legal
ethics. He has read widely on the subject and has compiled a considerable research library in this field. It was only natural that when the
Supreme Court of New Jersey decided to revise its entire system of
ethics proceedings, the matter was entrusted to Justice Mountain.
Our new system, which represents a dramatic change and improvement in the disposition of ethics matters, is largely the result of his
creativity.
Like Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Mountain is a strong exponent of the judicial power as vested in the Court under the Constitu-

tion. His opinion in Passaic County Probation Officers Association v.
County of Passaic,31 emphasizes the scope of this power and its primacy where involved. That case involved the question of whether
court rules governing employees who were an integral part of the
court system took precedence over legislative enactments governing
the same employees. 32 Justice Mountain found the Supreme Court's

30 100 N.J.L.J. at 1140.
31 73 N.J. 247, 374 A.2d 449 (1977).
32

Id.

at 249-51, 374 A.2d at 450-51. As a result of the passage of a County Court Judges of

Passaic County resolution, the County Chief Probation Officer issued a directive to the county
probation officers, extending the work day by one-half hour. Id. at 249, 374 A.2d at 450. This

change was necessitated by the Supreme Court imposed extension of the work day for trial
judges. Id.

Since this modification was adopted without previous consultation with the Passaic
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constitutional authority "to make rules governing the administration
of [all] courts" in the State to be "so clear... as to leave not the
slightest doubt that this Court possesses plenary authority with respect to all matters touching the administration of the court system in
New Jersey."

33

Thus, he stated:

The conclusion is quite inescapable that the constitutional
mandate given this Court... transcends the power of the Legisla-

ture to enact statutes governing those public employees properly
34
considered an integral part of the court system.

Justice Mountain is also a constitutionalist of the first order, believing that the New Jersey Constitution as the supreme law of this
State, means exactly what it says. Accordingly, the Justice feels that
this instrument can be modified or changed only by amendment duly
adopted by the people. His opinion in the 1977 case of Vreeland v.
Byrne,3 5 is a straightforward declaration of that philosophy. In that
case, Justice Mountain discussed the interpretation of article IV, section V, paragraph 1, of the New Jersey Constitution.3 6 That provision prohibits legislators from being "nominated, elected or appointed
to any State civil office or position, of profit," during their elected
term, if that position was created or the emoluments thereof have
been increased during that term 3 7 Justice Mountain's perspective
on the proper approach to interpretation of the constitutional provision was clear:
It is a familiar rule of construction that where phraseology is
precise and unambiguous there is no room for judicial interpretation or for resort to extrinsic materials. The language speaks
for itself, and where found in our State Constitution the language
38
is the voice of the people.

In a similar vein he finds in the constitution a clear prohibition
against one branch of government attempting to exercise powers

County Probation Officers' Association as the public employees' valid representative, this organization sought to enjoin the directive's enforcement. Id. at 250, 374 A.2d at 450. In support
of its action, the Association asserted that the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act,

particularly N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3, precluded enforcement of the directive absent good
faith negotiations on the suggested alteration. Id.
3a Id. at 252, 374 A.2d at 452.
34 Id. at 255, 374 A.2d at 453.

35 72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977).
36 See id. at 302, 304, 370 A.2d at 830, 831.
37 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 5, para. 1.
38 Id. at 302, 370 A.2d at 830.
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vested in another branch. His dissenting opinion in Robinson v.
Cahill,3 9 is an eloquent statement of his credo that courts should
leave legislative matters to the Legislature. The questions he raised
in that opinion, co-authored with Justice Clifford, go to the heart of
the matter:
If the Court undertakes to reallocate funds the ultimate disposition of which has been fixed by the Legislature pursuant to the
exercise of its acknowledged power of appropriation, how is this
new-found power of the Court to be controlled? How can it be
checked? We discern no way that this can be done. The power to
appropriate is singularly and peculiarly the province of the Legislature. It is commonly thought of as an adjunct to the taxing power.
If the courts are at liberty, for whatever reason, to reallocate appropriated funds in some particular case, why may not the courts
do so in other cases as well? Who is to stay the judicial hand and
what law is to guide its exercise? There are no discernible boundaries or limits beyond which the power might not be exerted provided only that the Court were made to feel that the exigency of
the moment was sufficiently serious to justify the action. It seems
to us that the exercise of such a power by the courts is indeed
unchecked, and that it cannot be said to fall within any relaxation
of the doctrine of the separation of powers that has thus far been
countenanced. 40

Justice Mountain reaffirmed his view of the separation of powers
doctrine in the exclusionary zoning case of Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison.4 1 There he stated: "No one questions that
zoning is a legislative function. When the judiciary-for whatever
reason-undertakes to move in this field, it immediately places in
issue its power of legitimacy." 42
What will perhaps be Justice Mountain's most widely read opinion is that in the recent case In re Farber.43 In that case, while
recognizing a newsman's statutory privilege against disclosure of news
sources and gathered material, the Justice held that this privilege, in
a proper case and upon a proper showing, must yield to a criminal
defendant's consitutional right to a fair trial and to have compulsory

39 69 N.J. at 174, 351 A.2d at 735.
40 Id. at 180, 351 A.2d at 737-38.
41 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
42 Id. at 628, 371 A.2d at 1266.

43 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978), cert. denied sub non. New York Times v. New Jersey,
99 S. Ct. 598 (1978).
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process for obtaining evidence in his favor. 44 Resolution of that issue
required Justice Mountain, once again, to examine the New Jersey
Constitution:
Article 1, 10 of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey
contains, as we have seen, exactly the same language with respect
to compulsory process as that found in the Sixth Amendment.
There exists no authoritative explication of this constitutional provision. Indeed it has rarely been mentioned in our reported decisions. We interpret it as affording a defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to compel-the attendance of witnesses and the
production of documents and other material for which he may
have, or may believe he has, a legitimate need in preparing or
undertaking his defense. It also means that witnesses properly
summoned will be required to testify and that material demanded

by a properly phrased subpoena duces tecunm will 4be
forthcoming
5
and available for appropriate examination and use.

An important point not to be overlooked, however, is that Justice
Mountain further held that the testimonial privilege will only yield
when proper procedural safeguards, including "a full hearing on the
issues of relevance, materiality and overbreadth of the subpoena,"
have been followed. 46 Thus, while reaffirming the primacy of constitutional rights, Justice Mountain stated most firmly "that this opinion is not to be taken as a license for a fishing expedition in every
criminal case where there has been investigative reporting, nor as
permission for an indiscriminate rummaging through newspaper
files." 47

Both Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Mountain, during their
respective terms, have played a large part in giving purpose and direction to the Court. Even after their retirements their influence will
continue to be felt as the improvements in court administration and
court procedures sponsored by them bear fruit. Their opinions will
serve to guide the Court for many years to come. New Jersey is fortunate to have had these jurists serve during a critical period in the
Court's history.

- 78 N.J. at 273-74, 394 A.2d at 337.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.

at 274-75, 394 A.2d at 337-38.
at 277, 394 A.2d at 338-39.

